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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Michele Harris appeals the judgment of sentence imposed 
on Richard Kones.  At sentencing, Harris sought restitution 
pursuant to the restitution provisions of the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664.  The 
district court concluded that it had no power to order 
restitution because Harris was not a "victim" of Kones' offenses 
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a).  We agree with this 
conclusion and will affirm. 
 
I. 
 Kones was a medical doctor licensed to practice 
medicine in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania when a grand jury 
indicted him on 200 counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 
3 
U.S.C. § 1341.  Specifically, the indictment alleged that Kones 
had submitted over $1,000,000 in false insurance claims based on 
nonexistent medical services to eighteen of his patients.  Harris 
was one of those patients.  According to the indictment, Kones 
submitted approximately $85,000 in false insurance claims for 
services that he never provided to Harris. 
 The government also filed an information adding charges 
for filing false claims with the Civilian Health and Medical 
Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 287 and laundering the funds received from the insurance 
companies in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.  The information 
sought criminal forfeiture of $2 million pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  
§ 982.    
 Kones and the government reached a plea agreement.   
Kones plead guilty to all counts and agreed to the $2 million 
forfeiture for purposes of restitution to the health insurance 
companies which were victims of his fraud, a sentence of between 
51 and 71 months in prison, a fine of up to $4 million, a payment 
of $1.5 million to the IRS to settle outstanding tax claims, a 
$10,100 special assessment, and the surrender of all of his 
licenses to practice medicine in the United States. 
 Before sentencing, Harris filed a claim for $1 million 
in restitution and submitted supporting affidavits.  Harris 
alleged that Kones gave her prescriptions for excessive amounts 
of a pain killer.  She contended that she became addicted, lost 
her job, and continues to need psychiatric care.  According to 
Harris, Kones did this in furtherance of his scheme and it was 
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only by inducing her drug dependency that he was able to control 
her and carry out his fraudulent scheme.   
 Accepting arguendo Harris' allegations of injury and 
Kones' motivation in prescribing drugs for her, the district 
court rejected Harris' claim for restitution and sentenced Kones 
pursuant to the plea agreement.  The district court concluded 
that it was without power to order restitution to Harris because 
Harris was not a "victim" of Kones' offenses of conviction within 
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a). 
 
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231 as Kones was charged with violations of federal 
law.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1291.  We exercise plenary review regarding whether a district 
court has power to order restitution.  United States v. 
Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1421 (3d Cir. 1992).    
 
III. 
A. 
 VWPA, 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) provides that a court, 
"when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under this 
title or section 46312, 46502, or 46504 of title 49, may order, 
in addition to or, in the case of a misdemeanor, in lieu of any 
other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make 
restitution to any victim of such offense."  Thus, in order for a 
district court to have power to order restitution, the person 
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awarded restitution must be "a victim of such offense."  Even 
where there is a "victim of the offense," § 3663(d) provides that 
the court may decline to order restitution "to the extent that 
the court determines that the complication and prolongation of 
the sentencing process [required to do so] outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to any victims."  We understand this 
provision to call for a weighing of the burden of adjudicating 
the restitution issue against the desirability of immediate 
restitution -- or otherwise stated, a weighing of the burden that 
would be imposed on the court by adjudicating restitution in the 
criminal case against the burden that would be imposed on the 
victim by leaving him or her to other available legal remedies.1 
 The legislative history of the VWPA does not provide a 
direct answer to the issue posed in this appeal, but it does 
reflect what Congress contemplated would be involved in making 
restitution awards and we find this helpful.  Nothing in the 
legislative history evidences an expectation that a sentencing 
judge would adjudicate, in the course of the court's sentencing 
proceeding, all civil claims against a criminal defendant arising 
from conduct related to the offense.  Rather, it was expected 
that entitlement to restitution could be readily determined by 
                                                           
1
  Section 5E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
provides that the sentencing court "shall . . . enter a 
restitution order if such order is authorized under 18 U.S.C. 
§§3663-3664" except to the extent that "full restitution has been 
made, or to the extent the court determines that the complication 
and prolongation of the sentencing process resulting from the 
fashioning of a restitution requirement outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to any victims through the criminal process." 
U.S.S.G. § 5E1.1 (emphasis added). 
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the sentencing judge based upon the evidence he had heard during 
the trial of the criminal case or learned in the course of 
determining whether to accept a plea and what an appropriate 
sentence would be.  While the original statute, similar to the 
current version, provided for discretion to decline to grant 
restitution when it would be an undue burden to do so, this was 
not because Congress expected that sentencing judges would be 
required to hold an evidentiary hearing on liability issues in 
the course of the sentencing proceedings.  As the Senate Report 
explains, "the Committee added this provision to prevent 
sentencing hearings from becoming prolonged and complicated 
trials on the question of damages owed the victim."  S. Rep. No. 
532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.A.N. 
2515, 2537 (emphasis added).  The kind of case that Congress had 
in mind was one in which liability is clear from the information 
provided by the government and the defendant and all the 
sentencing court has to do is calculate damages.  See id. at 
2536-37 (discussing a case where the victim of a purse snatching 
suffered a broken hip). 
 This aspect of Congress' expectation is important 
because it counsels against construing the text of the statute in 
a way that would bring fault and causation issues before the 
sentencing court that cannot be resolved with the information 
otherwise generated in the course of the criminal proceedings on 
the indictment.  We are persuaded that this counsel should guide 
our interpretation of the restitution provisions of the VWPA.   
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 In Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990), the 
Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "restitution to any victim 
of such offense" as used in § 3663(a).  Hughey was indicted for 
three counts of theft by a Postal Service employee in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1709, and three counts of use of an unauthorized 
credit card in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2).  After he 
pled guilty to one count of use of an unauthorized credit card, 
the district court ordered restitution for loss caused by all of 
the counts.  Id. at 413-14.  The Supreme Court held that "such 
offense" in § 3663(a)(1) refers to the offense of conviction.  In 
other words, Congress authorized restitution "only for the loss 
caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense 
of conviction."  Id. at 413.  Accordingly, the district court 
exceeded its powers when it ordered restitution for similar and 
related conduct that was not a part of the conduct constituting 
the offense of which the defendant was convicted.  Id. at 422. 
 Not long after the Supreme Court decided Hughey, 
Congress amended the VWPA by adding 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) which 
provides: 
For the purposes of restitution, a victim of 
an offense that involves as an element a 
scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of 
criminal activity means any persons directly 
harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in 
the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, 
4863 (1990).  This amendment, as Kones stresses, expands the 
restitution granting authority of district courts beyond that 
found in Hughey.  By its own terms, however, § 3663(a)(2) applies 
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only in cases where a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal 
activity is an element of the offense of conviction.  In such 
cases, § 3663(a)(2) authorizes restitution to "any person 
directly harmed by the defendants' criminal conduct in the course 
of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern" that was an element of the 
offense of conviction. 
 Section 3663(a)(2) expanded the district courts' 
restitution powers in such cases to the extent that a district 
court could order restitution for any harm directly caused by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, 
conspiracy, or pattern, even though such conduct is not "the 
specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction." 
See United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1421-22 (3d Cir. 
1992).  For example, where a defendant is convicted of defrauding 
person X and a fraudulent scheme is an element of that 
conviction, the sentencing court has power to order restitution 
for the loss to defrauded person Y directly caused by the 
defendant's criminal conduct, even where the defendant is not 
convicted of defrauding Y. 
 This expansion of restitution powers, however, is 
limited by its terms.  Section 3663(a)(2) is not so broad that it 
permits a district court to order restitution to anyone harmed by 
any activity of the defendant related to the scheme, conspiracy, 
or pattern.  Rather, in order for restitution to be permissible, 
the harm must "directly" result from the "criminal conduct" of 
the defendant.  In this context, we interpret "direct" to require 
that the harm to the victim be closely related to the scheme, 
9 
rather than tangentially linked.2  Further, we interpret 
"criminal defendant's conduct in the course of the scheme, 
conspiracy or pattern" to mean conduct that is both engaged in 
the furtherance of the scheme, conspiracy or pattern, and 
proscribed by the criminal statute the defendant was convicted of 
violating.3  When § 3663 is construed in this manner, restitution 
liability issues of fault and causation can be resolved on the 
basis of the evidence tendered by the government and the 
defendant in the criminal case without resort to evidentiary 
hearings on these collateral issues. 
 
B. 
 Here the offense of conviction was mail fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.4  A person commits mail fraud when 
                                                           
2
  The scanty legislative history on point provides us with only 
the following information: 
 
The use of "directly" precludes, for example, 
an argument that a person has been harmed by 
a financial institution offense that results 
in a payment from the insurance fund because, 
as a taxpayer, a part of that person's taxes 
go to the insurance fund. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 681(I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 177 n.8, reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6583 n.8. 
3
  We have no occasion here to address, and reserve for another 
day, the issue of whether in this context "conduct in the course 
of the . . . conspiracy" includes only conduct prohibited by the 
substantive statute which the co-conspirators conspired to 
violate.   
4
  18 U.S.C. § 1341 provides: 
 
 Whoever, having devised or intending to 
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or 
for obtaining money or property by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, 
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she has "devised" or intends to "devise" a scheme to defraud, and 
she uses the mails for the purpose of executing or attempting to 
execute the scheme.  18 U.S.C. § 1841; see United States v. Frey, 
42 F.3d 795, 797 (3d Cir. 1994).  Since a scheme is an element of 
mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) applies. Harris is not a 
"victim" of Kones' mail fraud offenses within the meaning of § 
3663(a), however. 
 The conduct that Harris alleges caused her harm is not 
conduct proscribed by the mail fraud statute.  The conduct 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
representations, or promises, or to sell, 
dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, 
distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for 
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious 
coin, obligation, security, or other article, 
or anything represented to be or intimated or 
held out to be such counterfeit or spurious 
article, for the purpose of executing such 
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, 
places in any post office or authorized 
depository for mail matter, any matter or 
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the 
Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be 
deposited any matter or thing whatever to be 
sent or delivered by any private or 
commercial interstate carrier, or takes or 
received therefrom, any such matter or thing, 
or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail 
or such carrier according to the direction 
thereon, or at the place at which it is 
directed to be delivered by the person to 
whom it is addressed, any such matter or 
thing, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
If the violation affects a financial 
institution, such person shall be fined not 
more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more 
than 30 years, or both.  
 
Kones also plead guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 287 and 
1957.  However, it is apparent that Harris' alleged injuries are 
wholly unrelated to the conduct which violated those statutory 
provisions.  
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proscribed by the mail fraud statute is the use of the mails for 
the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud.  Specifically, in 
this case it is Kones' submission of false insurance claims 
through the mail.  Harris does not allege that she was injured by 
the submission of the insurance claims.  She alleges that she was 
injured by faulty medical services.  While Harris alleges that 
Kones' provision of drugs to her was malpractice and was done in 
furtherance of his scheme, the provision of drugs, properly or 
improperly, is not conduct proscribed by the mail fraud statute. 
 Thus, we agree with the district court that "victim" 
within the meaning of § 3663(a)(1) and (a)(2) does not include a 
person who has experienced no harm arising from the criminal 
conduct that gives rise to the offense of conviction.  As the 
facts of this case illustrate, to hold otherwise would unduly 
burden sentencing courts.  No information developed in the course 
of these proceedings provided the district court with a basis for 
adjudicating whether Kones' treatment of Harris was legal or 
illegal, was consistent or inconsistent with medical standards 
prevailing in the community, or was or was not causally related 
to the injuries she allegedly suffered.  As the district court 
aptly observed, it could not grant Harris' restitution request 
without fully litigating a tangentially related medical 
malpractice case as a part of the sentencing process. 
 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
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